Friday, February 27, 2015

The Pittsburgh School Board

National Guard clear streets in Pittsburgh during race riot, 1968.

1968 was a tumultuous time in America. The war in Viet Nam, uprisings on college campuses, civil rights marches, riots in urban ghettos and the assassination of both Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King all contributed to a state of uncertainty and unrest. Locally, in terms of Pittsburgh public education, 1968 was a year of uncertainty and unrest as well.


Striking Pittsburgh teachers picket the Board of 
Education Building in Oakland, Feb. 9, 1968. 
In 1968, Pittsburgh public school teachers had their first labor strike which led to the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers (PFT 400) obtaining the right to represent its teachers in collective bargaining with the District. Although teachers unions existed in Pennsylvania for most of the 20th century, it was not until 1970 that they were legally given the right (PA Act 195) to strike. This was followed by a 1971 PFT strike to obtain a new contract and a long and more difficult strike in 1975 with disagreements on salary, class size, job security, teaching schedules and numerous issues regarding working conditions. The 1975 strike went on for 56 days in the middle of the school year.  The teachers won.



Also in 1968, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) began pressuring the Pittsburgh school district to integrate its schools. This was 14 years after the Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court ruling and four years after the Federal Civil Rights legislation of 1964. The PHRC nagged the district for five years (to no avail) before they finally filed a suit in Commonwealth Court in 1973 to force the district to integrate their schools. In 1978, the court ruled that the district must integrate its schools by 1979.

So what does all this have to do with the Pittsburgh School Board?  Like any governmental entity, school boards are political institutions and subject to public pressure. The 1968 political unrest, both at a national and local level, began to influence the discussion about how the Pittsburgh School Board was chosen. The community wanted greater accountability in its school board members. And unlike most cities in America, the Pittsburgh School Board was appointed, not elected. Significant changes pertaining to the Board were discussed starting in 1968 and culminating in major changes in 1976. These changes occurred due to pressure brought by Pittsburgh leaders and neighborhoods with a desire to engage in school district politics.

This is the story of how the Pittsburgh School Board went from being an appointed board, to an elected board, to a balkanized board. And how recent elections are an indication that we are moving in a new direction that reflects a concern over the districts very survival.





The Age of Oversight, 1911 - 1976


In 1911, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decided that the Pittsburgh School Board would be appointed by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. This was seen as a huge improvement to the original district plan which included many local school sub-boards that ran education in Pittsburgh's neighborhoods. A central school board would provide guidance, consistency and accountability for all city schools. By 1968, the only two school districts in Pennsylvania that had appointed school boards were Philadelphia (appointed by the Mayor) and Pittsburgh (appointed by the Court of Common Pleas.) Every other Pennsylvania school district elected their school boards.

In theory, an appointed school board provided school directors that had appropriate skills and expertise to lead the district. Often appointed boards consisted of highly educated professionals and leaders in the community. The system of court appointed Pittsburgh School Board Directors worked well enough for 50 years. However, the volatility of the 1960s, particularly with respect to labor and race, forced a rethinking of the school board makeup. Two key issues concerned the public.

Taxation without Representation: Since the board was appointed, they could not directly raise taxes to increase revenue. When the district needed additional funds, they had to appeal to the state legislature (elected officials) to increase Pittsburgh taxes. This added layer of political/legislative governance made managing the budget more difficult since the Pennsylvania legislature had to agree to the tax increases. This meant important Pittsburgh school district issues were resolved in Harrisburg. In 1968 this seemed paternalistic and far removed from the citizens of Pittsburgh.

School Board Director Qualifications: Pittsburgh's School Board directors were appointed by judges who were elected by the county (not just the citizens of Pittsburgh). Many of the judges did not live in Pittsburgh. Nor did they represent the demographics of Pittsburgh. They often appointed individuals who were leaders in the community or in business, but were far removed from Pittsburgh neighborhoods, especially those of color, ethnicity and working class residents. Or sometimes, the decisions were made in terms of local/neighborhood patronage. Either way, these decisions were made in a manner that was detached from the electorate. And detached from the needs of a quality education enterprise.


1968 Pittsburgh Press Editorial

With volatile issues of race and labor energizing the working classes of Pittsburgh, there was pressure to elect a local school board. Workers were skeptical about school directors who were not open to labor unions. Whites citizens were concerned about school directors who would follow the PHRC dictates to integrate the district. And black citizens did not trust white school directors who followed the wishes of the white community to not integrate schools. The population of Pittsburgh began to demand local control of their schools through an elected school board.

Between 1968 and 1976, various attempts were made to change the makeup of the school board.
  • The 1968 Pittsburgh Press editorial above called for an elected school board. 
  • In 1969 a Select Commission to study the Pittsburgh School Board recommended a hybrid 13 member board that consisted of 7 elected directors (from 7 districts) and 6 directors appointed by the mayor. The report was shelved.  
  • In 1972 the League of Women Voters recommended a nominating panel that would provide the judges with candidates. They recommended term limits and balancing candidates socio-economically and geographically.   
  • At the same time, in 1972, Max Homer, a state legislator, put forth a bill for an elected school board with 15 at-large members. 
  • A compromise bill was passed in 1973, that would have a two year planning period, followed by a recommendation for the number of board members and how they would be allocated geographically. This would then be presented to the Pittsburgh citizens via a referendum they could vote on.  
  • In 1975, Governor Shapp considered a bill that would call for an elected school board in which candidates could run under a political party endorsement (Democrat, Republican, Constitutional) and cross register if they wanted.  
  • In 1975, the legislature finally passed the bill stating there would be 9 districts each represented by a district board member. The governor signed the bill.  
  • In 1976, the Pittsburgh electorate overwhelmingly approved the elected school board plan.  
In 1977, an elected school board existed for the first time in Pittsburgh.




The Age of Leadership, 1980 - 1992


Relatively soon after Pittsburgh elected it's first non-appointed school board, the district hired Dr. Richard Wallace as Superintendent of the Pittsburgh Public Schools. Dr. Wallace had to address the issues of labor relations, eliminating the achievement gap between races, middle class flight to the suburbs and an elected (not appointed) school board. His stance was that of a professional educator who understood the mission, understood the politics and constraints of the time, and who had a model for a successful program for Pittsburgh schools. I will discuss three key initiatives that were part of Dr. Wallace's plan.

I. The Schenley High School Teacher Center 

Dr. Wallace felt that the success of the district was inextricably tied to the quality of the teaching corp. Thus it was imperative to help teachers improve at their craft, to develop a common language to discuss quality teaching and to make sure every teacher understood what it meant to be successful in his/her classroom.  

Towards that end, Dr. Wallace obtained a $10 million grant from the Ford Foundation to create a teacher center at Schenley High School. Over a four year period, every high school teacher spent six contiguous weeks at the center learning the language, behaviors and components of quality teaching. This was followed by both an elementary and middle school teacher center. The key to this project was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers.  


PFT - PPS Memorandum of Understanding
The significance of the MOU was noteworthy. Since the right to bargain on behalf of the teachers was granted in 1968, the union and the board saw either other as adversaries. When Wallace was hired by the District, he quickly realized he had to find a way to partner with the union on a project that would benefit both the District and the Teachers. The Schenley High Teacher Center was that project. The MOU was ground breaking, watched closely by districts across the country. Any partnership that would improve instruction, lead to higher achievement and raise wages was a win-win for everyone.


II. The MAP (Monitoring Achievement in Pittsburgh) Program

Dr. Wallace believed that to raise achievement for all students, the teaching staff, parents, students and school administrators needed to know exactly what they were trying to achieve in their classes and how students were progressing. To develop the program, Wallace had expert teachers identify the core skills to be obtained in their content areas (i.e. Mathematics, Reading, English, Science) and create tests of those skills. Four times a year districtwide tests would be given that showed students progress towards learning the skills. Because all stakeholders received this information, everyone could go to work on moving forward. Teachers would focus instruction where needed. Building principals were seen as instructional leaders who would analyze the data and help teachers improve at their craft. Parents would support students to do homework and get better at their skills. This comprehensive program was a full assault at stopping students from falling between the cracks.

The Director of Assessment (Dr. Paul Lemahieu) for the District conducted a study to determine the effect of monitoring student achievement through formative testing. He found the program worked well and demonstrated that a data driven focused academic program could lead to end of the year achievement as measured by national standardized tests. The MAP Program raised student achievement, addressed racial achievement gaps and was another means for partnering with the teachers union.


III. The Pittsburgh Magnet Program

Post Gazette Editorial
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission won its suit in 1978. The ruling forced the district to integrate by 1979. Yet, forced integration in cities across the country led to middle class white/black flight to the suburbs.The issue that was hanging over Dr. Wallace's administration was to find a way to integrate District schools. Wallace decided to use a methodology predicated on voluntary integration.

The district created many new magnet school programs: Elementary Foreign Language Magnets, A Montessori School, Classical Academies (Perry), a Middle/High School that was based on the International Baccalaureate program (Frick/Schenley), a computer science magnet (Brashear), a science and mathematics magnet (Westinghouse), etc. The district's magnet program was wildly popular. Magnet schools used race quotas that guaranteed a demographic balance in the school. And when enrollment was done on a first come, first served basis, it created huge demand for the schools. Even when the program moved to a lottery, it was well received. For a number of years, these magnet programs attracted parents who would otherwise have left the school district. They were popular and filled to capacity. And they began to integrate the District using a method that was appealing to everyone.

The 12 years of Dr. Richard Wallace's tenure as Superintendent of he Pittsburgh Public Schools was considered a time of enlightenment in the District. Wallace's tenure was progressive and successful.  All efforts focused on curriculum, instruction and assessment and equity for all students. Every effort was made to partner with the union. The results were impressive. Thus, there was little opportunity for the first elected school board to micromanage or play local community politics. That's not to say they didn't try.

Wallace demonstrated that a strong leader, promoting ideas that are proven and have integrity, can work with a board and get the job done. As noted in the Post Gazette editorial above, the transition to the 1990's, particularly if Wallace retired would be a difficult one. In retrospect, the editorial was an understatement.





The Age of Constituencies, 1992 - 2012


Dr. Wallace's 12 year term in the school district was extremely long for an urban superintendent. When he retired in 1992, the board was tasked with some very difficult decisions. Who to hire to replace him? Should they raise taxes to maintain the programming and infrastructure that was necessary for success? How to deal with the shrinking student body (due to continued middle class flight?)

The first item the board addressed was finding a new superintendent. Rather than conduct a national search, the board chose to promote a local administrator to Superintendent. Louise Brennan was a career Pittsburgh Public School teacher and administrator. Under Dr. Wallace, Mrs. Brennan was the Asst. Superintendent responsible for Elementary and Middle Schools. She was a traditionalist who came out of a time before integration, a time rooted in neighborhood schools. Rather than spend the money on curriculum specialists, professional development and high cost authentic testing programs, she wanted to get back to basics and focus on neighborhood schools. This played into the hand of a school board that was elected by local neighborhoods.

9 PPS Board Districts
Since 1976, there were 9 districts, each with an elected Board Director with no term limits. Three of the districts were gerrymandered to be majority black. The rest were predominantly white. And the board members, whether they ran as Democrats, Republicans or both, were elected by the communities where they lived. More often than not, they sent their children to the public schools in those communities. Simply put, to stay in office they would have to meet the needs of their communities.
































Note that each of the districts consisted of numerous city neighborhoods. Superimposing the neighborhood map onto the district map provides insight into a given district's demographics. Looking at the city from a race, ethnicity and socioeconomic perspective, Pittsburgh is a segregated city. In fact we are one of the least diverse, most segregated cities in the country. Some areas are almost all black: the Hill District, Homewood, Larimer, Beltzhoover, Manchester, Hazelwood, California-Kirkbride, Arlington Heights, St. Clair, Garfield, Lincoln-Lemington-Belmar, Perry South, Fairywood, East Hills. Some areas are almost all white: Bon Air, Carrick, Swisshelm Park, Squirrel Hill, Shadyside, Bloomfield, Beechview, Banksville, Brookline, Lincoln Place.

Consider how different this elected 9 member board was from the appointed 15 member board who were at-large. The new school board members were elected by district, often majority black or white and issues of race were at the forefront of decisions made by the board. Which schools were closed, which were renovated, which became magnets, how would busing occur and how were feeder patterns drawn?  It's not surprising that the prime directive for school board directors was to meet the needs of their local district.

Here is a list of one group of board members from the 1990's. Note their long tenure (8 - 32 years). And note the neighborhoods where they lived.

Liz Healey - 8 years - District 4 - Squirrel Hill
Alex Matthews - 12 years  - District 3 - Stanton Heights
Evelyn Neiser - 20 years - District 9 - Sheraden
Maggie Schmidt - 8 years - District 5 - Squirrel Hill
Randall Taylor - 12 years - District 1 - Point Breeze
Ron Suber - 14 years - District 8 - Northside
Jean Fink - 32 years - District 7 - Carrick
Jean Wood - 12 years - District 6 - Brookline
Darlene Harris - 8 years - District 2 - Spring HIll

Three black males and six white females. Three predominantly black districts and six predominantly white districts. There were 5 different superintendents from 1990 to 2000 (Wallace, Brennan, Frederick, Faison and Thompson.) Superintendent turnover created a leadership vacuum that was gladly filled by the 9 directors. Thus the district was being run in a self serving manner where directors fought over territories, resources, race and who would get which principals to run the schools in their district. The focus on education (process, product and equity) which was the theme of Wallace's administration was gone.

There was one other national issue that pushed the district toward a neighborhood model. The United States Supreme Court of the 1990's began to dismantle court ordered integration.
In the 1990s, a Supreme Court reconstructed by the appointees of Presidents Reagan and Bush handed down three very important decisions limiting desegregation rights and triggering a flood of lawsuits designed to end desegregation in major U.S. districts. In the 1991 Dowell case the Court held that desegregation orders were temporary and that school boards could return to segregated neighborhood schools. The next year, in the Freeman v. Pitts decision the Court authorized piecemeal dismantling of desegregation plans. Finally, in the Jenkins case in 1995 the Court rejected the effort of a lower court to maintain the desegregation and magnet school remedy in the Kansas City case until it produced actual benefits for African American students, thus drastically limiting the reach of the separate but equal promise of Milliken II.  (Resegregation of American Schools, Gary Orfield and John T. Yun June 1999)
By the end of the 1990's pressure from the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission was gone. Nationally (and locally) the words "neighborhood school" became the euphemism for "segregated schools". In Pittsburgh this occurred through the closings of many comprehensive middle schools and conversions of neighborhood elementary schools into K-8 schools. Since Pittsburgh neighborhoods are by and large, segregated, that meant that neighborhood K-8 schools were segregated as well. Some were all white, some were all black.


Pittsburgh Public Schools - Neighborhood K-8 Schools

The district, with its huge racial achievement gaps, was at the same place in 2000 as it was in 1968, except they now had local school board members they could hold accountable. And there was one other significant difference that was most important - the student population was a fraction of what it was when the District first considered having an elected school board.  





The End Game - Those with a vested interest.  


While the elected school board was evolving over the last 60 years, the district's enrollment decreased precipitously. Enrollment went from 72,000 students in the early 1960’s, to 48,000 in the early 1980’s, to 38,000 in the early 2000’s, to the current enrollment of approximately 24,000. Families left the city rather than integrate. The most obvious effect of this flight was a decrease in the number of public schools from 98 in the 1960’s to 54 in 2013. At 54 schools, many neighborhoods no longer had a public school (e.g. Hazelwood, Regent Square, Lawrenceville.) Students were bused to schools that consolidated the student populations of 2 or more neighborhoods. As neighborhoods lost their local schools, families become less engaged in public education. Some families stayed in the district, but attended private schools, parochial schools, charter schools or magnet schools. Some families stayed in the district and attended their segregated neighborhood school. And some left the district and moved to the suburbs. Community activism waned. Some gave up. And some looked to charter schools to provide a neighborhood school.  

A second less obvious, but very relevant, effect of the flight from the Pittsburgh schools pertained to student body demographics. Families that flee urban public schools often have more income that allows them mobility. Whether they pay to buy a home in the suburbs or pay tuition at private/parochial schools, they are allocating part of their income to what they consider superior schools. By default, the population that remains in the urban core is often poorer, with less means and more risk factors. Over the last 50 years, the average family income of Pittsburgh students dropped precipitously. More poor students, more broken families, more students with special needs all make the education enterprise more challenging. Finally, the flight to the suburbs also damaged Pittsburgh's tax base, thus causing budget problems for the school district.  

It is not a coincidence that the beginning of charter schools occurred simultaneously with resegregation. Flight to the suburbs, segregation based on both race and poverty, loss of tax revenue, higher costs for salaries, healthcare, utilities all created a challenging environment to educate children. And public school districts, organizations that have been in business for over 100 years, are not prone to reacting well or quickly to changing demographics. They struggle to keep up educationally, financially and politically. And they mumble about the good old days. 

Charter Schools were created to create a public school alternative that was more facile, more entrepreneurial and able to operate at a lower net cost.  Of course their very existence created additional problems for the public school district. They consumed time, energy, resources, funding and attention from the district. They were more like the district magnet schools. And often they were not neighborhood based.  

So who runs for the Pittsburgh School Board during times like this? In 2013 there were five seats (out of nine) up for election. Only one incumbent decided to run. Thus there were four open seats for the first time in many years. In the election, of the four seats, three were filled by former Pittsburgh teachers, one of whom spent the majority of her career working for the teachers union as the assistant to the President. The fourth new director was a parent who was endorsed by the union. 

In 2015, four more seats are up for election, with three incumbents not running again. This creates three new openings on the board. There are two people running for each of the three openings and the incumbent is running unchallenged for the fourth seat.  Seven people who want to be board directors.  Here are their backgrounds:

Candidate 1 - Incumbent - Retired Teacher/Principal from the Pittsburgh School District
Candidate 2 - Attorney and parent of two children 4 and 6 who attend a local university Montessori school.
Candidate 3 - Parent with a Masters degree in teaching and active in local schools with four children who have attended public, private and parochial schools.
Candidate 4 - Parent with a degree in teaching, married to a PPS teacher, with two children one of whom is school age and attends a city magnet school.
Candidate 5 - Parent with two students attending a city high school where she is the PTO president.  
Candidate 6 - CEO of a non-profit center that works with school aged black males.  
Candidate 7 - A legislative assistant with a Masters degree in education.  

Get the picture?

After the election in the Fall of 2015, there will be two directors that have more than 2 years experience on the board. In essence this will be a brand new school board. The board will consist almost solely of teachers, a principal and parents with backgrounds in education. The board will also have a strong teachers union bias.  

On the one hand this is fantastic. It is hard to find people more vested in quality education than teachers, a principal and parents. I believe they will work overtime to improve the district. And I believe they will try everything they possibly can to bring the district back.  
  
On the other hand this is distressing. This group of teachers, principal and parents only know what they know. They are running for election to become the Board of Directors of a $750,000,000 enterprise that has 24,000 customers and over 4000 employees. Their backgrounds are not in law, finance, governance, higher education or education reform. They are prone to believe that their local neighborhoods can save themselves. They are prone to believe that being in charge will allow them to "do the right thing."

If only it was that easy.

Our country has little or no example of urban school districts that have solved this 21st century urban public education problem. Dr. Richard Wallace came closer in Pittsburgh (and in our nation) than anyone I know. And his program was dismantled once he retired. This is not just a Pittsburgh problem. It is an American problem. My experience suggests that the answers lie in what we are learning at the individual quality school level. The answers lie in the commonalities between successful public, charter and independent schools that are succeeding with students in the urban core. They succeed in spite of limited resources, in spite of foolish state testing programs and in spite (not because) of the constant push for old style traditional schools. Some are union and some are not. Some are public, some private, some charter. But they all succeed because of exceptional leaders and exceptional teachers. There is no short cut to success.  

PPS Board Room
A School Board consisting of teachers, principals and parents. A School Board with a significant number of Directors who were members of the local teachers union. We are entering a new era when the elected Pittsburgh School Board consists solely of people who have an immediate vested interest in its success - teachers, a principal and parents.

We can only hope.

Friday, February 6, 2015

2001 - The Beginning of the End

This is a tale of Pennsylvania politics, a federal education bill and two national tragedies that came together to create a Perfect Storm. A storm that is pushing public education in Pennsylvania into a precarious position. This is not about school boards, teachers unions or school reform. This is not about public, private or charter schools. This is about politics. Both political parties are complicit. And, unfortunately, this situation is not unique to Pennsylvania.

Warning... This is a rather dense and dark blogpost, but well worth the read if you want to understand how we got into this mess.



GOOD TIMES (1990 - 2000) 


Prior to 2001, public education in Pennsylvania, though floundering academically, was financially solvent. The economy was strong, tax revenues were up and state pension funds were in better shape than at any point in their history. 

There are two state pension funds - PSERS (Pennsylvania Public School Employees Retirement System) and SERS (State Employees Retirement System). PSERS was founded in 1917 to provide public school employees with a pension plan. SERS was founded in 1921 to provide state employees including those at state universities, judges and elected officials with a pension plan. The basic facts of these pensions prior to 2001 were:
  • 10 years to be vested.
  • Contribution levels of 6.5% by the employee.
  • Contributions by the local district/employer and the state were determined by the state legislature.
  • Full retirement was 35 years served, minimum age 55.  
  • Payout used a formula based on 2% for each year served.
Both PSERS and SERS are defined benefit plans. This means that an employee's pension is based on years served and salary earned, not on the investment value of the annuity.

Annual Pension Payment = (# of years served) X (2%) X (Average of top three year salaries)

For example, a teacher who worked for 35 years and had an average of $76,000 for his/her three top yearly salaries would receive $53,200 (35 X .02 X 76,000) annually for life. Retiring prior to 35 years would cause penalties that would substantially decrease the annual pension.

In the year 2000, the financial condition of the two state pension plans was outstanding. There were two reasons for this.

First, the baby boomer teachers (a statistically large population born between 1946 and 1964) were contributing into the retirement system, but were too young to retire. Their anticipated retirement dates would be between 2002 and 2020. Thus there were more total employees currently employed and more pension revenues as a result.

Second, the United States economy was booming due to the rapid growth of information technology. During the decade starting in 1990 and ending in 2000, the Federal debt went from a -$221.2 Billion deficit to a $236.4 Billion surplus! The economy was booming and our country was not at war. Stock markets were strong and pension fund investments were increasing at a record pace.


PSERS - 1995 - 2000 



















If you look at the chart above a few numbers stand out. First, the PSERS funding ratio in 2000 was 125%. This meant that PSERS had more assets than liabilities. A funding ratio above 100% indicates that the pension or annuity is able to cover all payments it is obligated to make. This was great news.

Notice that in 1995, the combined state/district contribution was 16.6%.  In 1996, the state contribution went to 0%, although the state agreed to rebate a minimum of 50% of the district contribution back to the district. This odd bit of bookkeeping meant that the state and local district were each paying half of the contribution. In the next 5 years the District/State contributions decreased from 16.6% to 4.6% annually. The state and the districts were taking advantage of the good economy by cutting their contributions to the pension funds.

Pension plans are predicated on the fact that steady investments during both good and bad economic times are necessary to make sure that the fund remains 100% funded. The 1990's was an exceptional economic time. Hindsight (and competent pension management) suggests that a steady contribution during the booming economy in the 1990's would offset what might and did occur in the Great Recession in 2008. By cutting back on their contribution, the state was able to save money in the short term. This is good politics because it limits immediate tax increases and funds needy projects. This is bad economics since it begins to put the long term value of the pension at risk. The pension plan should be a hands off, stand alone financial activity. Note that no matter what the status of the economy, the employees contribution was consistent during this time.




Federal Testing, Greed and a Terrorist Attack (2001 - 2007) 


Three events occurred in 2001 that dramatically changed the public education outlook for Pennsylvania, both academically and economically.


Event 1 - No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
On January 23, 2001 the No Child Left Behind Act was presented to Congress. This bill was a re-authorization of the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). It is important to note that the federal government is not directly responsible for public education in the United States. That responsibility belongs to the 50 individual states. The federal involvement in education began in the 1960's to address issues of civil rights and discrimination with respect to race, handicaps and poverty. The ESEA authorizes funds to support schools to provide free/reduced lunch programs, reading recovery and academic support for poor and disabled students. It is a federal attempt at equity in education. 

In 2001, Congress and the President decided to exert pressure on public schools through a side door. The No Child Left Behind Act called for every school that received Title I funds to administer a common test (managed by the state) and assure that all students were proficient in Reading and Mathematics. This was the first time the federal government actively engaged in school reform. Basically, they were using the Title I monies as leverage for accountability in states and local school districts. They were forcing states and school districts to focus on the discouraging achievement gaps that existed based on poverty and race. The federal government wanted positive learning outcomes as a result of its investment. Senator Edward Kennedy (Democrat) and President George Bush (Republican) collaborated to assure bipartisan passage of the bill.

The NCLB act was signed in 2002 by President Bush. If an individual school or school district did not meet AYP (Adequate Yearly Progress - i.e. achieve the levels of proficiency prescribed by the Act), they would be placed into Warning, then in School Improvement and then in Corrective Action. In theory a school could be closed if they did not raise student achievement to acceptable levels. States ranked their school districts by their scores on the tests and published the results in the media. The feds ranked states by their scores on the tests. Even real estate agents listed local school district test scores on house listings to try and attract families. The pressure to do well was powerful. 

NCLB did not provide additional funding to support schools working with the highest risk students. They assumed the Title I funds were adequate. They simply said "Do Better or Else". To many educators it seemed mean spirited... as if they were picking on schools with high levels of poverty.  

In 2002, the first year of the program, schools had to achieve a relatively low cutoff score (see chart below) - 35% of the students proficient in Mathematics and 45% proficient in Reading. All but the lowest districts would have little problem meeting these initial scores. The benchmarks would slowly increase over the first 6 years of the program to 45% for Mathematics and 54% for Reading. This was a slow growth model that challenged only the poorest and lowest achieving school districts. Since the scores were public, and schools were supposed to achieve 100% proficiency by 2014, there was some consternation among school leadership. Many educators hoped the program would be changed or repealed prior to 2014.


Event 2 - Radical changes to SERS and PSERS 
In the same year that the federal government introduced No Child Left Behind, Pennsylvania changed its pension law in a manner that ultimately would put it at risk in the not so distant future. On May 17, 2001, Governor Tom Ridge signed Act 9 2001 into law. The Act changed two key elements of both pension funds.

First, Act 9 changed the number of years to be vested in the fund from 10 to 5, thus allowing more people to become eligible for a pension at an earlier age.

Second, it raised the pension benefit by 25% for existing teachers and state employees and 50% for existing judges and legislators. 


Original Formula                                                 2% X 35 = 70% of salary
New Formula Teachers & State Employees        2.5% X 35 = 87.5% of salary
Judges and Legislators                                        3% X 35 = 105% of salary

Changing the funding formula for existing members of a pension plan in the middle of their career is not appropriate. The actuarial calculations for the fund were based on a 2% per year payout. Changing the formula negated the existing projections. Although all PSERS and SERS participants would benefit, the group that benefited the most were judges and legislators. Ultimately, this was a grab for money while the fund was doing exceptionally well. And the lowering of the state and district contribution (as previously mentioned) was a political move to balance the budget by taking money from the pension plan.   

The concept of an annuity is predicated on a constant contribution and a solid investment strategy that provides a defined benefit at full retirement. If you lower your contribution and/or raise the benefit during good times you won't have enough money during hard times. The state legislature did both. They were kicking the can down the road.  It was unethical. But it was not illegal.


Event 3 - September 11, 2001 
The third event occurred the same year on September 11, 2001. A terrorist attack destroyed the Twin Towers in New York, damaged the Pentagon and murdered over 3000 citizens. As a result of this tragedy, our President committed us to a war in Iraq. The war cost over $4 trillion. The President did not provide for the funding of the war in the country's budget. Since the war was not reflected in the budget, the cost of the war simply added to the country's debt. In essence, the United States financed the war. This sent the country's financial markets into a tail spin. The stock market dropped and thus the value of state pension investments dropped as well.



PSERS and AYP - 2001 - 2007

























Note in the chart above, within the first 5 years after these three events- passage of No Child Left Behind, the modification to the PSERS/SERS pension formula and September 11 terrorist attack, the pension funding ratio dropped from 123% to 81%. Now the fund had more liabilities than assets. Yet no one seemed too concerned. State employees were happy with their higher pension rate. There was no noticeable increase in the employee contribution. The local district contribution was low so district's did not complain.   

Between 2001 and 2007, even though we were at war, it was a rather quiet time domestically. Our country's economy seemed to be on the mend. The stock market recovered, home sales were booming, property values were skyrocketing and our president was confident we were moving forward. Although at war, our president told us to "go shopping", to "get down to Disney World in Florida," to "take your families and enjoy life, the way we want it to be enjoyed." 

From an education perspective, NCLB was not overwhelming since the cut off scores were rather low. Just like with the pensions, we seemed to be kicking the academic can down the road, assuming someone would repeal the federal law when they realized it would be impossible to hit 100% proficiency.  

The future did not look that bad.


THE BEGINNING OF THE END (2008 - 2018) 




In December, 2007 the global economic bubble burst. The world was devastated by the Great Recession. The recession caused massive unemployment, the default of a number of investment banks, large numbers of home foreclosures and an economy that was stalled. The stock market plummeted and both savings and investments were significantly deflated. 

From a pension perspective, the Great Recession was devastating. Imagine the effect this had on Pennsylvania pension funds that in 2001 increased its benefit, decreased its contribution and had an increasing number of retirees (the baby boomers.) Both large and small retirement plans that were invested in the Stock Market almost immediately lost 1/3 of their value. Look at what happened to the PSERS funding ratio during the recession that began in late 2007 (2015-18 are PSER's projections.)


PSERS FUNDING RATIO BY YEAR



Pennsylvania's legislature was slow to act. With such a poor economy, overall tax revenue was down. There was little money to pump into the pension fund. The question was how to stop the pension fund from becoming so undervalued that it would not be solvent. Two laws, one federal and one state, addressed some of the immediate concerns.

Federal Emergency Funding - In 2009, Congress passed and President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). ARRA addressed the recession by creating and saving jobs, spurring economic activity, bailing out major manufacturers (General Motors and Chrysler) and investing in long-term growth. ARRA provided Pennsylvania with a large influx of money ($33.8 billion.)  Approximately $2.3 billion from the total was allocated for public schools. The ARRA funds were allocated during 2009 and 2010. 

The question was how should the state of Pennsylvania use these funds. Under Governor Rendell, the state decreased its basic subsidy to school districts at the same time that they gave the districts ARRA funds. So during 2009 and 2010 it appeared that state funding levels had increased. Actually, the state level decreased and the ARRA more than made up the decrease. After the ARRA funding went away in 2011, districts revenues were significantly down. Note in the graph below, 6 years after the Great Recession began (2014), local districts still were not at their 2008 level of funding. And that did not take into account increases in the district pension contributions to PSERS. The year the federal funds went away was the first of Governor Corbett's administration. He walked into a mess. And it didn't help that Governor Corbett was not considered a "public education advocate."


Decreasing state funding, ARRA funding and Pension Costs


More Changes to the Pension Fund: In an initial attempt to address the pension crisis, the state passed Act 120 of 2010. This put new teachers and state employees back at the 2% a year benefit rate. It also raised the number of years to be vested back to 10. Unfortunately, this would only affect pensions 35 years down the road.

In addition, in 2011, simultaneously with the loss of federal ARRA funding, the state announced a program of harsh pension contribution increases that districts (and the state) would have to comply with over a ten year period.  


PSERS  CONTRIBUTIONS - 1995 - Projected to 2018 






















As you can see from the chart above, district contributions would go from 5.6% in 2011 to 30.6% in 2018.

Let's make some sense of this. If a teacher has a salary of $50,000, the teacher would contribute 6.5% to retirement ($3,250). In 2011, at 5.6% the district had to contribute $2,800. In 2014, at 21.4% the district contributed $10,700. And in 2018 they will have to contribute $15,300. This five fold increase in contributions represents a huge burden on school districts. Since the state provides each district with a 50% rebate, the burden is shared by both the local district and the state.

2018 is when the actuaries believe PSERS will bottom out. Not surprisingly, that is when most of the baby boomers will have retired (and many of the older boomers will begin passing away.)

With districts having to pay so much more for pensions, state funding in 2012 below what it was in 2008, and federal ARRA money gone, there was a serious budget crisis in Pennsylvania schools.























At the very same time this fiscal crisis was occurring, the No Child Left Behind Act dictated that local achievement (AYP) must rise to unattainable levels. Note in the table above, from 2010 to 2014, proficiency cut offs increased from 63% to 100% in Reading and 56% to 100% in Mathematics.  Not only was this impossible, but districts had to achieve this with less money as they began bailing out the pension fund. Let's be honest, only bureaucrats in Washington DC would pass a law stating that every child in the country would be proficient in Reading and Math.


Who pays for the damage done by the Perfect Storm?  The Children.  


Why am I calling this a Perfect Storm?  Much of this post is about the pension crisis in Pennsylvania and what caused it. But the most important concern is what affect does this funding crisis have on education, learning and the needs of students. 

At the same time in 2012 that the pension contribution was going up precipitously for districts, so was the benchmark for AYP. The graph below is a strange, yet relevant juxtaposition of economics and academics. One line represents pension costs and the other line represents what percent of the students must be proficient at reading. They are following the same path. Higher costs and higher achievement. It is extremely hard to raise achievement to unprecedented levels when you have to spend unprecedented high levels of money to bail out the pension plan.


Costs Go Up as Academic Outcomes Must Go Up


The federal government gives an ultimatum. Make every student proficient in reading and mathematics by the year 2014. The state government turns to the districts in the same time period and demands they spend more money on pension contributions (at no fault of their own.) And at the same time, the state decreases their basic education subsidy to local schools. So what should a school district do?  

Since district budgets must be balanced, School Boards and Superintendents have two choices - raise taxes or cut costs. In the current political environment in our country and state, no one is about to raise taxes... especially during a recession. So school districts cut costs.  And since they are held accountable by the state and federal government for scores in Reading and Mathematics, you can guess what is cut.  

Cut programs included physical education, the arts, foreign languages and electives. Class sizes increased. Extracurricular programs were cut. Paraprofessionals (teaching assistants) were cut. Athletics such as the football team were not cut, but students in those activities began paying a fee to participate. All efforts went into increasing test scores. 

After 2010 the cut off scores went quickly from 72% to 100%. For the first time AYP was not being reached in middle class districts in the suburbs. This infuriated families who moved to the suburbs to get away from the cities, from poverty and from what they perceived as bad schools. 

Right wing conservatives picked up on this and began trying to discredit public education in general and teachers unions in particular. They blamed the unions, the pensions and the school boards for this terrible situation we were in. They saw this as an opportunity to tear this huge "entitlement program" down. They didn't care that this was a pension grab by a Republican legislature and signed by a Republican Governor. They didn't care that the pension when run legally and competently did what it was supposed to do: provide public employees with a quality retirement. They didn't understand that the goal of a public employee pension was to provide an incentive and reward for seeking a career in public service. The concept was not wrong, the greed of the legislators was. Nor did the federal government have a clue what contortions would occur when a country's education policy is predicated on a punishment based system resulting from high stakes testing.  

That is the Perfect Storm. Politicians working their magic. Mucking around with the pension system for short term budget balancing and selfish personal gain. Messing with public education in a non-supportive, naive and abusive manner. And the students, our children, our future, bearing the brunt of it.

It is always our children who suffer the consequences of our selfishness, our hubris and our greed.