Post Gazette April 18, 2015 |
They are considering dissolving their Middle and High School programs and paying for their students to attend schools in neighboring districts. This harkens back to the closing of Lincoln High School in Midland in 1985 and Duquesne High School in 2007.
What makes the Wilkinsburg announcement unusual is that they are not suggesting the decision is based on finances. They are basing their decision on the Superintendent and Board's belief that "the district can't offer as wide a range of courses or extracurricular activities because the student numbers aren't there to support them."
Where have the students gone? And what would happen if they went to a neighboring district? It's time to revisit Wilkinsburg at greater depth to understand the problem their School Board is grappling with.
Context for Wilkinsburg's Current Dilemma
1983 Editorial |
In 1983 Midland Pennsylvania was out of money. Tax revenue from local steel mills had always supported the public schools. The closing of those mills and the reassessment of the mills caused a huge drop in revenue. For the next 14 years, Midland tried everything it could to survive. They looked at plans to consolidate their schools. They tried to merge with any of the 14 neighboring schools districts in Beaver County. They presented a rationale for merging that saved money, improved education and created efficiencies. No one would merge with them.
Then they tried to pay tuition to send their students to neighboring school districts. In 1985 an agreement was signed with Beaver Area School District to allow Midland students to attend Beaver Area High School. Midland would pay tuition for each student. Approximately 200 Midland students attended Beaver High School annually.
Closing the Books at Beaver |
This seemed like a reasonable model for handling the students from a distressed community. The problem was that many of the students in Midland were black and from lower middle class families. And Beaver Area schools were in an all white community. You can guess what kind of reception the Midland students received. After years of arguing and dissension, in 1997, Beaver canceled their contract with Midland.
No one wanted to work with Midland, no one wanted their students... they were on their own. They were the poor cousins of Beaver County. Midland's Superintendent, Nick Trombetta, was furious at the backward attitude of the Beaver County School Districts.
Can you imagine what the students felt like?
Ohio Teaches PA a Lesson |
The anger that Midland felt towards its neighbors was considerable. The same year that Midland sent its high school students to Ohio to get educated, Pennsylvania passed its charter school law (1997). As Midland began to grapple with its limited resources and its high school students attending school in another state, it begin to consider its alternatives in light of the recent charter school law.
"... history has a way of changing things, and Trombetta became energized with anger he perceived over the treatment of the Midland Borough School District by its neighbors. That anger led him to one innovation after another: the Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School, the Lincoln Park Performing Arts Center and Charter School, an online curricula research team, plans for a cyber school in Ohio and, perhaps most important for Midland's future, a foundation to spearhead community reinvestment" (Post Gazette, January 19, 2005).
Midland, as a community, became revitalized through the growth of these charter-based educational innovations (1997 - 2005). New buildings, new jobs and new choices for Midland students. The growth of Midland's charter schools continues to the present time.
Unfortunately, in 2007, a grand jury investigation into Superintendent Trombetta and the management of the schools he created, led to an indictment in 2013. Trombetta has stepped away from all of the organizations he helped to create in Midland. The case is currently working its way through the court system.
This year, East Liverpool ended their contract with Midland. By 2015 they were serving only 10 students (down from 110 originally). Midland high school students are now attending local charter schools rather than making the trip to East Liverpool. As a community, Midland continues to benefit from the jobs created by the many educational initiatives that are located in town. And there is little love lost between Midland and the other Beaver County communities.
Midland Timeline - 32 years
1983 - 1985 Attempt to merge with Neighboring Districts
1985 - 1997 Students attend Beaver Area School District
1997 - 2015 Students attend East Liverpool Ohio School District
2015 - Students attend Charter Schools
Duquesne, Pennsylvania
The story in Duquesne is not all too different from that in Midland. District revenue relied on the local steel industry. When the mills shut down, Duquesne lost tax revenue... and jobs. In 1984, there were discussions about merging Duquesne School District with the neighboring West Mifflin School District. As in Midland, the merger concept went no where. For the 15 years after the mills closed, the Duquesne's student body shrank, and those students who remained in the district were poor, at-risk and in need of support. There were no jobs in Duquesne.
The Duquesne School Board was at a loss as to how to save the District. In 1993, although in debt, the district decided to embark on a large capital project: consolidating their elementary, middle and high school into a single facility. The Duquesne School District invested over $16 million in renovating their high school into a K12 building. The renovation went over budget and had numerous setbacks. The newly renovated school reopened in 1998.
Post-Gazette , October 12, 2000 |
By 2000, the Duquesne public schools was financially bankrupt. They appealed to the state which declared the district financially distressed and imposed a three person Board of Control to run the district. In 2007, the Board of Control determined the school district was unable to afford to educate its high school students. The state stepped in and paid for Duquesne High School students to attend either West Mifflin or East Allegheny High Schools. These districts did not agree to do this voluntarily. They were forced by the state to accept the Duquesne students. In 2012, the tuition program was expanded to include 7th and 8th graders.
Post Gazette 2007 |
Duquesne Timeline - 31 years
1984 Steel Mill Closes
1984 - 1993 Attempts to merge with neighboring school districts
1993 - 1998 In debt, closes elementary school and renovates high school
into a K12 facility
2000 Duquesne School District Bankrupt
2000 - 2015 Three Person Board of Control appointed by state.
2007 - 2015 State mandates that HS students attend either West Mifflin or
East Allegheny. State pays their tuition.
2012 - 2015 State mandates that MS students attend either West Mifflin or
East Allegheny. State pays their tuition.
With Midland and Duquesne we have case studies of districts that were financially distressed, had a shrinking student population and couldn't offer quality services to their students within their existing district. In Midland, they cobbled together a tuition based model that worked for 30 years. In Duquesne, the state forced a state funded, tuition based model on two neighboring districts that has been in existence for 8 years. Both districts have been grappling with this problem for over 30 years. The problem began when the steel mills closed and their tax base disappeared.
The question is whether there is something to be learned from these two case studies as Wilkinsburg grapples with a similar problem.
Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania
Wilkinsburg, unlike Midland and Duquesne, was not a community that was home to steel mills, manufacturing plants or corporate headquarters. It was a middle class bedroom community of employees of many Pittsburgh industries. Called the "Town of Churches", it was a conservative, dry, white, Protestant community that bordered Pittsburgh to the east. For more background on Wilkinsburg take a look at my first blogpost on the topic -
What to do About Wilkinsburg.
So what has occurred recently that has forced the Board to consider sending grade 7-12 students to neighboring school districts?
Membership
First, let's look at the District's current membership.
This chart is a compilation of data collected from the 2010 US Census and current 2015 school district reports to the board. To the best of our knowledge there are over 2100 school aged children in Wilkinsburg. Only 835 (39%) attend the public schools. 343 (16%) attend Charter Schools and 957 students (45%) either attend parochial or private schools, or they fake an address in order to attend neighboring district public schools.
61% of Wilkinsburg school aged children do not attend the local public schools.
61% of Wilkinsburg school aged children do not attend the local public schools.
It may come as a surprise that many students in Wilkinsburg fake addresses to attend neighboring school districts. It is common knowledge in Pittsburgh's East End that students move between Penn Hills, Wilkinsburg, Pittsburgh and Woodland Hills. Often they do not move physically. These students use a relative's address to enroll in a neighboring district in order to attend their schools. This "illegal school choice" methodology is what families, without the means to move, do in order to try and get their children a better education.
One can surmise that most students who start in Wilkinsburg public schools, and then leave, attend charter schools. 835 students in Wilkinsburg schools and 343 students in charters add up to 1178 students. This is approximately the number of students who would be in the District schools if everyone who entered Wilkinsburg schools stayed.
Charter Schools
Note that between 20 to 40 Wilkinsburg students attend charter schools per grade.The grade to grade number is relatively consistent with a marked increase in 11th grade.
Wilkinsburg students attend 17 different bricks and mortar charter schools and 9 different cyber charters. The largest groups of Wilkinsburg students who attend charters go to Propel Braddock Hills (81), Urban Pathways (40) and the Environmental Charter School (29). Two of these schools are the closest charter schools to Wilkinsburg, and one is a high school 17 minutes away from the busway stop in Wilkinsburg. Thus, it appears that parents are looking for school options that are in close proximity to where they live.
Believe it or not, Wilkinsburg pays charter schools the highest tuition rate in the county, $14,557 for regular education students and $34,206 for Special Education students. I will discuss this further in the next section on Financial Concerns.
What is clear is that 61% of Wilkinsburg parents are choosing from 26 different charters and many different private, parochial and public school districts to provide schooling for their children.
Financial Concerns
2014 - 15 Wilkinsburg Schools Budget |
- Wilkinsburg's has one of the lowest tax bases in the state (properties, businesses, etc.). This is due to hundreds of abandoned properties and businesses.
- Thus Wilkinsburg has the highest school district property tax millage rate in the state.
- Wilkinsburg public schools have an extremely high percentage of at-risk students - Economically Disadvantaged (76%), Special Education (20%) and African-American (94%).
- The district receives a large amount of State and Federal Revenue to support this at-risk population.
- Wilkinsburg is only serving 39% of the Borough's student population.
Extremely high tax rates, a relatively high rate of support from the state and federal governments, and a very low rate of Wilkinsburg students who attend the local public schools creates a strange financial picture. Wilkinsburg has the highest expenditure per student in Pennsylvania with the lowest achievement. This is hard to imagine.
The chart at the right shows the per student expenditures for Wilkinsburg during the 2014 - 2015 school year. *Note, for this analysis the per student rates represents a combined rate using both Regular Ed and Special Ed funding.
$24,983 per student was spent on the 835 students in the Wilkinsburg schools.
$18,796 per student was spent on the 343 Wilkinsburg students who attend Charter Schools.
Hypothetically, if every Wilkinsburg school age child (2118 students) attended the district schools, the per student expenditure would be $12,896. This is almost the exact amount Wilkinsburg spent in 2000-01 when almost all the students in the Borough attended the Wilkinsburg schools.
So what's the point?
The point is that Wilkinsburg is a broken school district that is spending a huge amount of money per student (in their care) and getting terrible results. Wilkinsburg knows that. The only difference is that for the first time the School Board is considering alternatives to the existing schools.
They are currently using a strategy of looking for "Education Partners" that the district could work with. Offering $3 million to a neighboring school district to "partner with" and educate 200 students would allocate $15,000 for each of those students. This would save the District money and provide a revenue source for the partnering school district. And it would get Wilkinsburg out of the Middle/High School business... sort of.
So does this tuition based model make sense? I would suggest that there are two key problems to consider that are unique to Wilkinsburg's location and situation.
The point is that Wilkinsburg is a broken school district that is spending a huge amount of money per student (in their care) and getting terrible results. Wilkinsburg knows that. The only difference is that for the first time the School Board is considering alternatives to the existing schools.
They are currently using a strategy of looking for "Education Partners" that the district could work with. Offering $3 million to a neighboring school district to "partner with" and educate 200 students would allocate $15,000 for each of those students. This would save the District money and provide a revenue source for the partnering school district. And it would get Wilkinsburg out of the Middle/High School business... sort of.
(Superintendent) Matsook is proposing an “educational partnership” in which Wilkinsburg would pay to send students in grades 7 to 12 to another district, but Wilkinsburg students would continue to be tracked and monitored separately. It would eliminate some merger-related concerns and, Matsook said, “We do not want to lose our identity. We are Wilkinsburg, and we're proud to be from Wilkinsburg.” (Pittsburgh Tribune Review, May 7, 2015)Wilkinsburg has approached the new PA Secretary of Education who is willing to consider the model of Wilkinsburg paying for the students to attend neighboring schools, yet keeping the accountability for their success in Wilkinsburg. This concept regarding "academic accountability" is odd. It's almost another way of saying "our students are poor and limited and probably won't achieve at the same level as your students, but that will be our responsibility, not yours". What a cynical and sad notion.
So does this tuition based model make sense? I would suggest that there are two key problems to consider that are unique to Wilkinsburg's location and situation.
Problem One - Be careful who you want to do business with.
The news reports state that Wilkinsburg approached Penn Hills and Woodland Hills, and plans to approach the Pittsburgh Public Schools. A review of the School Performance Profiles for these neighboring districts' high schools suggests we would not get much bang for our buck. All of these local high schools are significantly underperforming. All the districts are achieving far below acceptable performance (greater than 60% proficient.) Both Woodland Hills and Penn Hills have higher achievement than Wilkinsburg, but even that is deceptive. If you filter for similar demographics (race and economically disadvantaged), they are doing a very poor job with their at-risk students.
The only reason Wilkinsburg is considering these three districts is that they border Wilkinsburg. If we paid for our students to attend these districts, our students would not do much better academically. And besides... they don't want us. Our poor disadvantaged students are not their concern. Frankly, they don't know what to do with their own at-risk students. And we learned from both the Midland and Duquesne case studies that these districts would not be welcoming.
The only reason Wilkinsburg is considering these three districts is that they border Wilkinsburg. If we paid for our students to attend these districts, our students would not do much better academically. And besides... they don't want us. Our poor disadvantaged students are not their concern. Frankly, they don't know what to do with their own at-risk students. And we learned from both the Midland and Duquesne case studies that these districts would not be welcoming.
Problem Two - What would the other families do?
It is important to remember that over 1300 (61%) school aged children in Wilkinsburg do not attend Wilkinsburg schools, but still have the option to do so. As Wilkinsburg moves forward and suggests possible alternatives, they must contemplate what these families will choose for their children's education.
For example, if Wilkinsburg doesn't have a middle or high school, and chooses to pay another district to educate those students, they must consider the fact that many more people may want to avail themselves of this opportunity. This would create a much heavier burden for the receiving school district and a much greater cost than Wilkinsburg may have contemplated.
Look at one scenario involving the Pittsburgh Public Schools. If any Wilkinsburg child could attend the Pittsburgh Public Schools and take advantage of magnet schools such as Pittsburgh Science and Technology Academy, Barack Obama Academy of International Studies, Pittsburgh School for the Creative and Performing Arts or magnet programs at Allderdice (Pre-engineering) or Brashear (Computers), there might be a huge outpouring of students who would do so. If Pittsburgh only allowed access to its comprehensive schools (Westinghouse, Perry, University Prep, etc.) there would be much less interest and reason for partnering.
Look at one scenario involving the Pittsburgh Public Schools. If any Wilkinsburg child could attend the Pittsburgh Public Schools and take advantage of magnet schools such as Pittsburgh Science and Technology Academy, Barack Obama Academy of International Studies, Pittsburgh School for the Creative and Performing Arts or magnet programs at Allderdice (Pre-engineering) or Brashear (Computers), there might be a huge outpouring of students who would do so. If Pittsburgh only allowed access to its comprehensive schools (Westinghouse, Perry, University Prep, etc.) there would be much less interest and reason for partnering.
The return of the 1300 students who have left the Wilkinsburg schools creates a fundamental problem for Wilkinsburg. What if they were to return in order to take advantage of one of these "partner relationships"? Could the District pay for all those students with their extremely low tax base?
What should Wilkinsburg do?
I would suggest that what we have learned from Midland and Duquesne is that sending your students to another District is not a great idea. Often they are not welcomed. And often neighboring districts are not a huge improvement on the status quo. Nor have we considered the psychological effect on our children when their community schools fail and they are sent to another district where they are often disparaged. Finally, both case studies show a protracted time frame that continues to evolve over a 30 year period with no resolution. This is not a permanent solution. Wilkinsburg is down to a graduating class of 29 students. Should we really go through the same excruciating process that Midland and Duquesne experienced? I would suggest that there are two possible paths to consider.
Strategy I - Merge With Pittsburgh
In this scenario the two municipalities would merge and Wilkinsburg would only exist as a neighborhood in the city. In some sense, Pittsburgh and Wilkinsburg has moved toward this in the last few years.
In 2006, Wilkinsburg contracted with the City of Pittsburgh for its garbage collection. Pittsburgh underbid the private contractors and won the contract. The contract saved Wilkinsburg money and demonstrated that the two municipalities could work together.
In 2011, Wilkinsburg merged its fire department with the City of Pittsburgh. The result was at no additional cost to Pittsburgh, a cost savings for Wilkinsburg and quality fire protection for Wilkinsburg.
The two remaining civic responsibilities are the police department and the schools. This begs the question why the two municipalities have not totally merged. Merging would solve a number of major Wilkinsburg issues: the high tax rate, the low tax base, access to better schools (particularly the Magnets) and no loss in services. And this would immediately solve the problem of the 957 students who don't attend the Wilkinsburg schools but have the option to do so. Pittsburgh certainly has the capacity to educate these children (if they choose) within their existing facilities. There is no rational reason why Wilkinsburg should not merge with the city.
Some might argue that our autonomy is an asset. Frankly, the only aspect of Wilkinsburg that is unique from Pittsburgh is that we are a "dry community"... no bars or liquor licenses. This is an artifact that started with Prohibition in 1920. And the question of liquor licenses is currently a referendum in the May primary that will be decided by Wilkinsburg voters. Clutching to a fond memory of Wilkinsburg as a unique and thriving community is a classic Western Pennsylvania reflex. For all intents and purposes, the Wilkinsburg of fond memories does not exist.
And let's not suggest that Wilkinsburg has nothing to offer Pittsburgh. Wilkinsburg's location, it's housing stock and it's opportunity for growth is quite positive. From a tax perspective, Pittsburgh would gain Wilkinsburg's property taxes (at the lower Pittsburgh rate) and would also gain Wilkinsburg's income taxes (at the higher Pittsburgh rate - 3%). This would be an incentive to develop real estate in Wilkinsburg and attract young millennials to the area. If you think this is pie in the sky, look at the current development in Lawrenceville, East Liberty, South Side, the Strip, the Lower Hill, etc. It would add to Pittsburgh's footprint, its population and its neighborhoods.
In 2006, Wilkinsburg contracted with the City of Pittsburgh for its garbage collection. Pittsburgh underbid the private contractors and won the contract. The contract saved Wilkinsburg money and demonstrated that the two municipalities could work together.
In 2011, Wilkinsburg merged its fire department with the City of Pittsburgh. The result was at no additional cost to Pittsburgh, a cost savings for Wilkinsburg and quality fire protection for Wilkinsburg.
The two remaining civic responsibilities are the police department and the schools. This begs the question why the two municipalities have not totally merged. Merging would solve a number of major Wilkinsburg issues: the high tax rate, the low tax base, access to better schools (particularly the Magnets) and no loss in services. And this would immediately solve the problem of the 957 students who don't attend the Wilkinsburg schools but have the option to do so. Pittsburgh certainly has the capacity to educate these children (if they choose) within their existing facilities. There is no rational reason why Wilkinsburg should not merge with the city.
Some might argue that our autonomy is an asset. Frankly, the only aspect of Wilkinsburg that is unique from Pittsburgh is that we are a "dry community"... no bars or liquor licenses. This is an artifact that started with Prohibition in 1920. And the question of liquor licenses is currently a referendum in the May primary that will be decided by Wilkinsburg voters. Clutching to a fond memory of Wilkinsburg as a unique and thriving community is a classic Western Pennsylvania reflex. For all intents and purposes, the Wilkinsburg of fond memories does not exist.
And let's not suggest that Wilkinsburg has nothing to offer Pittsburgh. Wilkinsburg's location, it's housing stock and it's opportunity for growth is quite positive. From a tax perspective, Pittsburgh would gain Wilkinsburg's property taxes (at the lower Pittsburgh rate) and would also gain Wilkinsburg's income taxes (at the higher Pittsburgh rate - 3%). This would be an incentive to develop real estate in Wilkinsburg and attract young millennials to the area. If you think this is pie in the sky, look at the current development in Lawrenceville, East Liberty, South Side, the Strip, the Lower Hill, etc. It would add to Pittsburgh's footprint, its population and its neighborhoods.
Strategy II - Create a Turnaround School District
In this scenario Wilkinsburg would remain a unique municipality and have its own school district. It would take advantage of the amazing opportunity that the Pennsylvania charter school law provides. Rather than attempt to reform district schools that are bound by past practice, union contracts and lack of understanding as to how to succeed with high poverty populations, it can start anew.
There currently is a national movement to help create Turnaround Schools. A turnaround school is a district method for completely changing the way a school functions in order to radically improve student achievement. There are Four Turnaround Models:
Model 3 - School Closures would not work since Wilkinsburg is a small LEA that has no other middle/high school to transfer students to.
Model 4 - Transformations is what the district has attempted for the last 35 years with no success.
I would suggest that Model 2 - Restarts is the one that should be considered for Wilkinsburg. It provides a fresh start, with new staff, a new approach and a cost efficient model.
There currently is a national movement to help create Turnaround Schools. A turnaround school is a district method for completely changing the way a school functions in order to radically improve student achievement. There are Four Turnaround Models:
1. Turnarounds. Replace the principal, rehire no more than 50 percent of the staff, and grant the principal sufficient operational flexibility (including in staffing, calendars, schedules, and budgeting) to implement fully a comprehensive approach that substantially improves student outcomes.
2. Restarts. Transfer control of, or close and reopen a school under a school operator that has been selected through a rigorous review process.
3. School Closures. Close the school and enroll students in higher-achieving schools within the LEA.
4. Transformations. Replace the principal, take steps to increase teacher and school leader effectiveness, institute comprehensive instructional reforms, increase learning time, create community-oriented schools, and provide operational flexibility and sustained support. (The School Turnaround Field Guide, Pg. 4-5)Model 1 - Turnarounds would not work in Wilkinsburg due to current state law and union contract restrictions.
Model 3 - School Closures would not work since Wilkinsburg is a small LEA that has no other middle/high school to transfer students to.
Model 4 - Transformations is what the district has attempted for the last 35 years with no success.
I would suggest that Model 2 - Restarts is the one that should be considered for Wilkinsburg. It provides a fresh start, with new staff, a new approach and a cost efficient model.
Restarts. Transfer control of, or close and reopen, a school under a school operator that has been selected through a rigorous review process. A restart model must enroll, within the grades it serves, any former student who wishes to attend.
Case Example: Mastery Charter School Shoemaker Campus in West Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was taken over by Mastery Public Charter Schools in 2006. Mastery’s model includes a strong focus on individualized instruction, teacher coaching and professional development, a culture of high expectations, rigorous academic standards, and problem-solving and social-emotional skills. In three years, the school more than tripled reading scores from 20 percent proficient to 71 percent proficient and raised math scores from 15 percent proficient to 88 percent proficient — completely closing the achievement gap and even outperforming state averages. (The School Turnaround Field Guide, Pg. 22)
The current charter school law would accommodate this strategy. And there exist current models of school success in communities like Wilkinsburg in Pennsylvania. Wilkinsburg could put out an RFP and review proposals from successful organizations like Mastery or Young Scholars in Philadelphia, Propel or City Charter High School in Pittsburgh, or national nonprofit charter management organizations (CMOs) such as Uncommon Schools or Aspire Schools.
Bringing in a successful education organization and restarting Wilkinsburg Schools as 21st Century Learning Academies would put the district on the map. It would bring many Wilkinsburg students back into the schools and would provide an incentive for families to locate in the district. It would raise property values and incentivize new business initiatives. This strategy would take vision, passion, hard work and a comprehensive approach by a forward thinking School Board and community.
Wilkinsburg... 16,000 citizens, 2100 school aged children, 2 square miles. Beautiful old Victorian brick homes... some renovated, some falling down. Great location. Great access to Pittsburgh. High poverty, abandoned. Plenty of school buildings.
I've lived in Wilkinsburg for 35 years. I'm not going anywhere. We don't live in fear... there are many hard working, caring people in this town. We are angry at what has been done to our community. We feel abandoned. Our community has been on life support for quite a long time... since the late 1960's.
Either merge with Pittsburgh or do a turnaround and get a fresh start in our schools. Sending our children to neighboring districts with poor achievement is sad, demeaning and most importantly, not a model that works. It is time to make a move... for our children.
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